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PROPERLY RESOURCING THE "SHAPE" PILLAR
OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

by

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Abstract

This paper addresses the dichotomy between our current National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Cold War resourcing paradigm supporting it. It proposes creating a new resourcing category, “engagement”, to directly support the “shape” pillar of the NMS.

Chapter one discusses the origins of “preventive defense” and its importance in our overall defense strategy. Chapter two identifies the problem of our Cold War funding paradigm not fully supporting our National Security Strategy or NMS. It describes the lack of correlation between the NMS, the current planning processes and the major resource categories. It highlights the blur that often occurs between “shape” and “respond” activities. Given a dedicated programmatic for resourcing “shaping” activities presently does not exist, it explains how this often results in these activities unsuccessfully competing against Service training activities within Service funding venues for readiness resources. Chapter three provides recommendations for evolutionary changes to the current planning, programming and budgeting system to heighten the Defense Department’s awareness of its investment in the “shape” pillar of the NMS and establish a methodology for resourcing this key NMS endeavor. The paper also proposes to create a stronger correlation between the Services’ Program Objective Memoranda and the Commander in Chiefs’ Integrated Priority Lists and Theater Engagement Plans. The paper concludes by stressing the importance of a new engagement programmatic that formally supports the “shape” element of the NMS.

Chapter 1

Introduction—The Best Kind of War

The best kind of war is never fought, more importantly, it is never even contemplated. Two and a half thousand years ago Sun Tzu, general for the King of Wu in China, began to touch on this idea when he wrote: “To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting. In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good.”¹ Sun Tzu assumed an enemy for his army, but as we approach the new millenium there are those who believe that the activities of a country’s armed forces, in combination with other elements of national power, can in many instances actually prevent the emergence of an enemy.

This idea, labeled “preventive defense,” was carefully outlined by Secretary of Defense William Perry, five years after the United States demonstrated its military supremacy in the Persian Gulf. To ensure the American military’s future success, Secretary Perry did not espouse as most important the thoughts or methods of Clausewitz or Jomini, both of whose principles were showcased in the Gulf War, rather he returned to the next logical extension of Sun Tzu’s preferred bloodless “sheathed sword”² approach of achieving the objective without fighting. Speaking to the John F. Kennedy School of Government in May 1996, he set forth “preventive defense” as the country’s “*first line of defense*,”³ followed by deterrence and then conflict. He

drew an analogy, stating that just as preventive medicine “creates the conditions which support health, making disease less likely and surgery unnecessary, preventive defense creates the conditions which support peace, making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary.”⁴ Preventive defense emphasized a new approach for our military—to primarily “convince” from a coequal status, other militaries of the world of the proper role and value of the military within a democracy. This element of “convincing”, best exemplified and most effective when demonstrated by our own military forces, takes many forms and occurs primarily through military-to-military contacts, which results in the building of personal relationships at all levels. Of course, preventive defense also recognized there would remain times, hopefully fewer in number and intensity, when the U.S. military would need to “compel” through deterrent means or “coerce” through conflict, to achieve national security objectives.

Preventive defense rests on three premises: first, “fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands” make for a safer world. Second, democracy in more nations of the world translates to “less chance of war.” And third, “defense establishments have a role to play in building democracy, trust and understanding.”⁵ In these three premises he identified America’s biggest future threat and echoed the President’s then two-pronged National Security Strategy (NSS) of engagement and enlargement. He went on to reemphasize the importance of the military’s role in preventive defense, noting that in many countries the most cohesive institutions were the military...and “in short, [these militaries] can either support democracy or subvert it.”⁶ Concluding his remarks, he reminded his audience of the long-term propitious results of practicing preventive defense, saying “preventive defense involves hard work and ingenuity today so that we do not have to expend blood and treasure tomorrow.”⁷

Not surprisingly, in 1997 following the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published a new National Military Strategy (NMS) containing the three elements of "Shape, Respond and Prepare Now."⁸ The strategy's element of "shape" captured the priority and content of preventive defense. The new triad of the NMS gives it an enduring character, making the strategy independent of a particular adversary. The strategy places great emphasis and reliance on the prevention of conflict resulting from countries embracing, adhering to and interacting from a common baseline of democratic ideals and principles, yet it remains mindful of our past lessons regarding preparedness and maintains a watchful eye on our military capabilities required in the future.

Given there is no exact definition of "shaping", and since its formal inclusion in our NMS there have been countless references to accomplishing this element of the strategy through many different means, many of which have been long ongoing, it may prove helpful at this point to broadly define what the author considers as "shaping" activities by the military. First, a shaping activity is not an activity that is meant to primarily support the "Respond" and "Prepare Now" elements of our NMS. This is important in that it excludes activities where the use or posturing of force is meant to compel or deter and most certainly excludes its coercive use or activities primarily meant to exercise forces to execute a deliberate war plan. Second, shaping activities will have at their core a fundamental goal to convince a nation's military of some aspect of its appropriate behavior within the construct of a democracy, and may or may not have an intrinsic training value for our own forces. Later in this paper, the author expounds on the importance of even more narrowly defining shaping activities as a part of an overall set of recommendations to properly resource the "Shape" pillar of the NMS.

Chapter 2

The Problem—A Cold War Resourcing Paradigm

Since the end of the Cold War the National Security Strategy (NSS), which outlines our country's broad military, economic and diplomatic approach to national security, and our National Military Strategy (NMS), the Chairman's approach to fulfilling the military objectives of the NSS, have taken on greater importance. The strategies have attempted to create a construct from which the armed forces of the United States can address the emergence of seemingly unpredictable sources of regional instabilities and transnational challenges around the world. These security challenges, without the suppressing nature of the bipolar world, began to manifest themselves in such forms as terrorism, aggressive behavior by rogue states seeking resources and power, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

To counter this new, diverse range of threats, the NSS supports a new approach stressing an "imperative of engagement" and emphasizes that our national security rests in our preparedness and willingness to integrate and use all necessary instruments of national power to achieve our national security objectives. The NSS stresses the necessity of American leadership across the globe, resisting our tendency to migrate toward isolationism, in order to actively "shape" the international environment to protect our interests.⁹

Broadening Interests

Primarily because of our lone superpower status and our unique capabilities, the interests of the United States have correspondingly broadened in nature to not only include “*vital interests*,” but also “*important national interests*” and “*humanitarian and other interests*.”¹⁰ This implies the United States will not only act when our physical security or economic interests are at stake, but we must also be prepared to act when we can influence our “well being” or the “character of the world in which we live.” In some cases such as humanitarian disasters, our own national “values” may demand that we act.¹¹ The NSS asserts that the “underpinning” of this American leadership around the world is “the power of our democratic ideals and values,” and “without our leadership and engagement, threats would multiply and our opportunities would narrow.”¹²

As the military instrument of national power, the armed forces of the United States embraced this imperative of engagement, making it a foundational pillar in the NMS. In pursuit of achieving national security objectives, the NMS ascribes to three fundamental pillars: shape, respond and prepare now. Specifically, the armed forces will help “shape” the international environment in order to avoid, recover from, or reduce the need to respond. It will “respond” to crises in order to regain stability on terms favorable to the United States or win the nation’s wars. It will “prepare now” to best posture for challenges of the future.

Balancing a New Element in Our Strategy


To establish and maintain a balance of the elements of this new triad of our NMS (which implies the correct emphasis on each element of the strategy, not equal funding) will require a modification to our current resourcing paradigm. The relative emphasis to place on each element of the strategy will vary given the security environment in each area of the world. The aggregate of these assessments from the regional Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) will provide the overall

Department of Defense (DoD) “shape” emphasis. Getting this new three-way balance between engagement, readiness and modernization right is vital to making our new strategy work for the future, just as striking the right balance between readiness and modernization brought us success in the past.

Our capability to respond or “readiness” and its importance learned through previous conflicts, and our willingness to prepare, demonstrated in our heavy investment in “modernization” of weapon systems, paid handsome dividends during execution of the United States’ first post-Cold War test in the Gulf. Throughout the Cold War, modernization and readiness represented the two key and competing resourcing categories supporting our military strategy which aimed to defeat the Soviets on the battlefield. Out-manned and out-gunned, our forces required a technological edge. They also demanded the best leadership and training possible, all ready to fight on very short notice. The investments in new and high-technology weapon systems procured during the 1980s and the readiness lessons emanating from the Vietnam War and subsequent conflicts came together in the Gulf and seemed to affirm that the DoD had struck the proper *balance* when allocating its resources primarily between the two broad categories of “modernization” and “readiness.”

As previously discussed, military strategy evolving after the Gulf War included emphasis on a third primary purpose of military forces, that is, helping shape the international security environment. While the military has traditionally carried out shaping activities such as peacetime military-to-military contacts, in 1997 the NMS formally documented the elevation in importance of this shaping role, making it a coequal in a new triad, joining the traditional responding and preparing roles. Given this emphasis, this paper proposes the formalization of a dedicated resourcing category called “engagement” to support the DoD’s shaping element of the

NMS. This new resource category would establish a clear, measurable and visible means of resourcing commitment to each of the pillars of the NMS. The new “engagement resource category would correspond to Shape,” while “readiness continues to correspond to Respond” and “modernization continues to correspond to Prepare Now”.



Since the military has always been involved in shaping activities, resourced as part of the readiness category, one might ask why form a new category of resource allocation? To fulfill its intended “preventive” role, there are two primary reasons post-Cold War shaping requires a distinctive programmatic. First, in the past the U.S. military’s primary consideration when involved in military-to-military contacts was the training value our soldiers received. But the primary motive of today’s shaping is different, because now more than any time in its history, the U.S. armed forces are being asked to be ambassadors not only for their country, but ambassadors for the military profession. Many take for granted that our military represents the strongest on earth, but what many do not fully appreciate—is the important characteristic of “meekness” which maintains and undergirds this strength. Meekness, for lack of a better term, is strength under control. For the United States this manifests itself through civilian control of the military, from creating the policy that decides its uses and employment to determining the level of resources that determine its lethality. As more and more countries continue to embrace

democracy, this characteristic remains the most important to communicate and even more importantly, to demonstrate. However, given that the primary purpose of today's shaping activity is to help "convince," through example, other militaries of their proper role in a democratic society, it's no surprise that when stacked against traditional Service training activities in an ever-constrained budget environment, shaping activities are out-prioritized by needs to ready the force to respond. Thus the second reason for a distinct programmatic—in the Service funding venue where organize, train and equip is the mission to fund—shaping activities can't fairly compete with readiness activities.

The Blur Between Shaping and Responding

The primary cause of the blur occurring between "shape" and "respond" activities is the Services are carrying the training emphasis of their "organize, train and equip" role into the CINCs' theater of operations. When CINCs ask for units to shape, they assume the units are ready to perform a shape mission, not continue training. Remembering that the primary objective for shaping is to "convince," not "compel," then training benefits are not the primary measure of merit, but certainly can be a by-product of shaping activities. Not surprisingly, Services often insist on training value or resist participation. This sets up an awkward competition within training budget venues and is most evident in the Army where a portion of both European Command and Southern Command's shaping activities presently compete with traditional Army training activities within the Army's Training Program Evaluation Group (PEG) for limited funding. Whereas regional CINCs have responsibilities to plan and execute—make no mistake—they do not control and have very little influence within the Service resource venues. In the case of the Army, shaping activities are often out-prioritized by training activities that bolster the Army's readiness to conduct operations on the battlefield. These shaping

resource shortfalls, relatively small in overall dollar amounts, but large in strategic significance, are always revisited by CINCs in the fall budget reviews. Nearly always supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and returned to the Services for funding, this vicious cycle takes a toll on CINC staffs, Service staffs, and the Joint staff who normally must clarify the issues and make recommendations to OSD. Worse, this phenomena over time introduces funding instability, which long ago the acquisition community showed eats away your most precious resource—people, as one enters the unbreakable cycle of justification on a proposed budget, rather than “locking-in” the budget proposal ahead of time and better planning its execution. This is especially applicable in this case, considering “shaping” activities are among the most complex and time-consuming to plan. The bottom line—shaping activities are competing in the wrong venue and given that the inevitable budget give and take continues—in the end the present process just adds to the workload of already overtaxed staffs and ultimately diminishes the effectiveness of the originally proposed shaping programs. Shaping activities competing within the wrong resourcing venue is only part of the problem. Shaping activities, funded within current readiness programs, also subject themselves to readiness resource decisions.

Allowing Services to manage shape activities within readiness accounts underscores the lack of accountability and visibility inherent in the present resourcing process. Again, using the European Command and Southern Command theaters as an example, each CINC conducts combined exercises, but with a different primary objective in mind. The European Command theater, as a potential Major Theater of War (MTW), has as its primary purpose—training to rehearse elements of deliberate contingency plans. Conversely, the Southern Command theater, not considered as a potential MTW, has as its primary purpose—theater engagement or shaping.

So, within the executive agent's (the Army) purview, and under the same programmatic, are two sets of activities with the same label, but with different purposes. When Congress cut the combined exercise program in fiscal year 2000 it had two very different effects to the two theaters. European Command received a reduction to rehearse contingency plans, whereas Southern Command received a reduction in its primary mission—engagement. Even without funding cuts, given limited resources for “exercises,” it's easy to conclude how shaping will take second place in this organize, train and equip environment. Given this competition within wrong venues continues, it is also difficult to conceive how the DoD can maintain the insight or control required in order to balance resource levels across the elements of its strategy. The Services are rightfully oriented on maintaining readiness and modernization for the future, while the regional CINCs are oriented on shaping the security environment in their areas of operation. However, all the resources are controlled by the Services under the Cold War bi-resource paradigm of readiness and modernization. Therefore, there will likely never be adequate resourcing committed for shape activities unless engagement funding is allocated above the Service level.

Fortunately, within the DoD, there is a planning evolution occurring that promises to help sort through this “strategy to plan to activity to resource” dilemma. The United States military has long generated operational, concept and functional plans in order to respond to crises. Realizing the contribution of technology and the increased effectiveness and inevitable nature of combined and joint warfighting, along with sensing a “revolution in military affairs,” the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has articulated his vision for warfighting through JV2010 Implementation plans to help guide our investments now for our weapon systems of the future. Also most recently, the Joint Staff directed theater CINCs to document their regional engagement or “shaping” activities in what is known as their Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs).

Therefore, as with the previously described resourcing categories, a similar construct exists between the military's broad planning processes and each of the pillars of the NMS: "the CINC's Theater Engagement Plan corresponds to Shape," "operational, concept and functional plans correspond to Respond" and "JV2010 Implementation Plans to correspond Prepare Now." However, the resourcing utility associated with TEPs can only be realized by separating the activities of shaping from responding for each of the theater CINCs. Clearly our strategy directs us to cover three fronts, and our plans are designed accordingly. Yet, our resources continue to flow on just two lines—readiness and modernization. Our strategy and our planning have adjusted to post-Cold War realities, but our resource concepts have not.

Likely Counter Arguments

While many are convinced the United States has crafted the right strategy for the future, most will balk at the idea of another resourcing category to ensure its proper execution. The *loss of flexibility* to allocate resources where needed will likely be the biggest argument against the creation of a new category of funding. Ironically, once the overall balance is struck between the pillars, which implies shaping and responding activities have been delineated, flexibility becomes the enemy of maintaining balance. Why?—because when there is flexibility, or the ability to extort immediately from the long-term preventive strategy, the extortion nearly always occurs. Congress recognized this tendency of warriors, who are rightly most concerned with the here and now. They subsequently gave us different colors of money, to include a color to ensure modernization by instilling discipline in military choices involving the long-term equipping and caring of the force. Without that forcing function, no doubt some believe warriors would sharpen their sword daily, without the proper emphasis on thinking of ways to improve it or of introducing new weapons to take its place, much less the thought of *not using their sword at all*.

Real flexibility will occur when the blur that presently exists between “shape” and “respond” is removed and the preventive nature of the strategy is allowed to work over time. Activities then can compete with those of similar strategic purpose and will be less likely to suffer from parochial interests. Then shaping activities will compete against shaping, and similarly for modernization and readiness.

Budgeteers are not the only resistance facing this new funding paradigm. There will also be many leaders on the policy side who will show reluctance to establish a separate category of funding for engagement or “shape” activities—mainly because of the belief they’d be opening pandora’s box, subjecting their traditional readiness resources to a zero-sum budget transfer. Even worse, both groups will fear the risk of losing future budget authority based on the uncertainty that the policy set forth for the military in the NSS and accepted in the NMS will stand the test of a possible near-term political change. While this kind of thinking demonstrates a complete misunderstanding for the purpose, benefits, and level of investment required for “shaping,” it is not hard for some to imagine budget authority established for this important mission evaporating in a sweeping reform by those who claim our armed forces are overtaxed and we must scale back on the propensity to commit military troops. It’s important to recognize that while some could claim our forces are over committed, they are over committed in a “respond” role, not in the “shape” role. The distinction between responding and shaping is important to understand because there are many who would unknowingly throw shaping out so to speak, when answering a mandate to reduce responding. The unintended results this blur may cause is most recently exemplified in the previously mentioned cut to the joint exercise program. While primarily intended to reduce operational tempo—a very good reason—not many realized

the collateral damage this caused to executing critical shaping activities, which undergird the major and preventive pillar of our NMS.

Still, there are others who question the legitimacy or need for shaping at all. Ronald Steele, in his article *The New Meaning of Security*, states "there are other reasons why we [the United States] should involve ourselves with other nations, but defense, or national security is not a compelling one...it is striking that the class of specialists we call 'national security managers' has set out for itself the task of global management."¹³ It is interesting that the theater CINCs, who are charged with the responsibility for the military's role in "shaping the international environment," see a much different value in "global management" activities.

Notes

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, edited and with a forward by James Clavell, Delacorte Press, New York, 1983, 15.

² *Ibid.*, 15.

³ Jim Garamone, "Perry Pushes Preventive Defense", *American Forces Information Service News Articles*, May 1996, np, on-line, Internet, 30 November 1999, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint>.

⁴ Quoted in "Perry Pushes Preventive Defense".

⁵ *Ibid.*, np.

⁶ *Ibid.*, np.

⁷ *Ibid.*, np.

⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Shape Prepare, Respond Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*, Washington D.C., 1997, np, on-line Internet, 30 November 1999, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms>.

⁹ William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington D.C.:The White House, October 1998, 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

Notes

¹² *Ibid.*, 2.

¹³ Ronald Steele, "The New Meaning of Security", U.S. National Security: Beyond the Cold War, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 26 July 1997, 63.

Chapter 3

Verifying Shape as a Key Part of the Strategy

Proponents of a new resourcing category are gaining ground and there exists far-reaching agreement that “shape” is now an important pillar of our strategy. In addition, the preventive nature of shaping activities and the promise of cost avoidance actually gives credence to an implied priority for engagement activities when weighed against respond and prepare activities. Historically, cost avoidance has not counted for much in military decision-making circles. What counted was cost savings because that meant money for the here and now. If congressional testimony by theater CINCs regarding the positive value of shaping is any indicator, this trend may reverse itself.

A View from the Leaders Responsible

James Kitfield, in his *National Journal* article “The Hollow Force Myth”, states that despite what some have called “the ‘promiscuous’ use of the military for ‘ill-conceived’ missions, the strongest proponents of these shaping operations are the four-star commanders in chief stationed around the globe.”¹ Despite perhaps his mistaking of response activities for shape which we’ve discovered is an easy thing to do, the author does bring home the firm belief theater commanders hold in the preventive and cost-benefit aspects of shaping. Kitfield quotes Admiral Lopez, former CINC of NATO’s southern region. The Admiral stated “to prevent future conflicts, which is the most important thing we can do for our grandchildren...requires us to remain

engaged in the world in a very focused way. I simply cannot influence events...if my forces aren't out there. My message is simple: You have to pay for peace, but it's a hell of a lot cheaper, in terms of both money and lives, than having to fight a war."²

The Admiral was echoing the sentiments of Supreme Allied Commander Europe and CINC European Command General Wesley Clark. During his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier in March of 1998, General Clark explained his theater strategy was "designed to prevent or limit a single conflict through active engagement while preserving the capability to respond to crisis. Preventing a single conflict or major operation...more than pays for all our engagement programs."³

Southern Command by nature of its theater and its experience in shaping, best understands the preventive aspect and benefits of engagement. Its Marine four-star commander, General Charles Wilhelm, gave specific testimony and evidence of the strategy's impact in the Western Hemisphere. He credited "engagement activities, frequent country visits, and personal relationships with key military leaders" for creating the opportunity to head-off extra-constitutional measures during Paraguay's recent electoral crisis, and the appointment of two more civilian ministers of defense in Brazil and Honduras, as two significant and positive events directly resulting from shaping. He also underscored the contributions of the U.S. military before, during and after a humanitarian disaster. The commander testified in April 1999, "before the storm [Hurricane Mitch in 1988] we conducted a series of disaster preparedness exercises for the nations of Central America and the Caribbean...applying lessons learned at the exercise, several nations significantly modified their disaster response organizations and procedures. At the recently concluded Defense Ministerial of the Americas, the Minister of Defense from Guatemala publicly announced that had his country not incorporated lessons learned from the

exercise, the death toll in Guatemala [from Hurricane Mitch] would have measured in thousands rather than hundreds.”⁴

These are only a handful of the many examples of shaping and there is little doubt regional CINCs strongly believe in this latest addition to the NMS. One regional CINC's Programs and Resources Directorate (J-8) has emphasized the “preventive” importance of shaping by drawing an analogy to American industry's focus on quality during the past decade. A supporter of a separate “engagement” resource category, the organization believes that as with the quality movement, the key is to design a funding process that ensures “preventive” engagement activities are successfully carried out in order to help reduce the likelihood of having to respond to crises.⁵ While the overall benefits may often be difficult to quantify in the future international security environment, their impact is certainly evident as exemplified by the previous examples of the Paraguayan elections and the humanitarian support to the Caribbean and Central America.

The Services, Particularly the Army, Embrace Shape

The Services have all embraced the new strategy, in some measure, in their posture statements. Interestingly and perhaps appropriately in the cases of European Command and Southern Command, the U.S. Army claimed in its Fiscal Year 2000 Posture Statement that it possesses “unique and robust shaping capabilities” which give it “lead role” in executing the first pillar of the NMS. Affirming the first pillar as “indispensable in minimizing potential threats,” the Army goes on to say:

...the pillar is best supported by long-term, face-to-face activities that build friends and cement trust, promote stability in fragile societies, strengthen coalitions, and ensure cooperation with traditional allies. Given the majority of other nations' militaries are dominated by their armies, military engagement with these countries is most effective through army-to-army contacts...the presence of an American soldier is the principal method to execute these [shaping] activities.⁶

While the Army has served as the primary example in this paper, there are obviously others such as the Air Force, Navy and many interagency players such as the Coast Guard, who also contribute to shaping the international security environment. There is no question they also possess the same problem of having no distinct resource lines between the funding of their shaping and responding activities.

Given its increased importance, today's military shaping activities are increasingly a part of a more complex and grander interagency strategy overseen by the ambassador to impart American democratic ideals. This evolving interagency approach further highlights the inadequacy of decision-making within present resourcing venues within each of the Services. This not only places decision-making at the wrong level, but also makes it difficult for those decision-makers to fully weigh the impact of their resourcing decisions on regional engagement objectives. It makes it nearly impossible for those overseeing regional engagement activities to aggregate the impact of a multitude of Service decisions on those same objectives.

Readiness has always represented the foremost priority in terms of measuring the potential effectiveness of our armed forces. However, if every decision had been made for the present with the near-term crisis in mind, our armed forces would not presently enjoy the technological edge we possess over our potential adversaries. Just as vision and prudence dictated that a portion of our budget now labeled "modernization" be set aside from readiness needs to ensure our military superiority in the future, that same vision articulated in both the NSS and NMS, now awaits a prudent fiscal decision to establish a separate funding category dedicated to shaping. This will first help us understand our potential adversaries better, but more importantly, help avoid conflict and better characterize our military alliance structures across the globe.

The remainder of this paper will describe a way to better resource the "shape" pillar of the NMS; specifically how can the Department of Defense, particularly the Joint Staff, the theater CINCs, and the Services better link this element of the NMS to plans, then to tasks and finally to the required resources.

Notes

¹ James Kitfield, "The Hollow Force Myth", *The National Journal*, 12 December 1998, 10, on-line, Internet, 30 November 1999, available from CIS, Congressional Universe.

² *Ibid.*, 10.

³ Senate, *Prepared Testimony of General Wesley K. Clark, Commander in Chief, United States European Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 3 March 1998, np, on-line, Internet, 30 November 1999, available from CIS, Congressional Universe.

⁴ Senate, *Prepared Testimony of General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 13 April 1999, np, on-line, Internet, 30 November 1999, available from CIS, Congressional Universe.

⁵ LTC Dave Nadeau, *United States Southern Command Issue Paper: "Strategy to Resources" for Shape Pillar is Broke*, Spring 1999, 1.

⁶ United States Army Chief of Staff, *United States Army Posture Statement Fiscal Year 2000*, Washington D.C, February 1999, 4.

Chapter 4

Evolutionary Steps Towards A Revolutionary End

The recommendations in this chapter assume one is convinced that shaping deserves the priority and visibility associated with it having a corresponding resourcing category and that there is agreement that shaping activities should compete for resources against other shaping activities, not training or response activities. This chapter also recognizes that change comes slow to major resourcing processes for good reason. The question then becomes—what evolutionary steps (or incremental adjustments to the present budgeting and planning processes) should the Department of Defense (DoD) take to achieve a revolutionary end in defense resourcing—that is a dedicated programmatic for shaping to ensure proper balance among the elements of the NMS?

Supporting national security objectives, “shaping” activities are performed by the DoD as well as many other agencies within the U.S. government. Recommendations within this chapter will focus only on DoD’s effort to improve the resourcing of shape activities, not the efforts of other government agencies. One can foresee a time when the DoD’s deliberate planning process will evolve into the Interagency arena, resulting in the formation of a collaborative planning process ultimately led by the National Security Council which integrates of all elements of national power. Given this eventuality, that many believe will occur because the “integration” promises to bring about “savings,” it would be prudent for the DoD to understand and have

visibility to the resources it is dedicating to the shape element of the NMS. While the present Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process and Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) process do not fully support proper resourcing of the shape pillar, they do contain the potential to do so. Other large processes that may require minor adjustment are the CINCs' Integrated Priority List (IPL) and the Joint Warfighting and Capability Assessment (JWCA) process.

In general, a poor link currently exists between CINCs' IPLs, the TEPs, and the Service Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) to carry out the "shaping" element of the NMS. CINC IPLs are often vague or overly cumbersome and do not necessarily tie their needs or their prioritization to the differing elements of the NMS. CINC TEPs, until recently, were incorrectly sequenced to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. Information in TEPs and their annexes incompletely describe the entire engagement or "shape" requirement, and there is not presently a mechanism to track the Service's resourcing of the programs to meet this requirement. Service POMs do not contain the necessary fidelity to identify to CINC staffs how adequately shaping requirements are resourced.

The following sections of this chapter represent broad recommendations and associated considerations in order to achieve those recommendations.

Distinguish Between Shaping and Responding

The first step to ensure "shaping" activities are properly resourced is to clearly distinguish shape activities from response activities. One of the primary problems this paper has highlighted is that shaping activities are not readily identifiable, mainly because of the somewhat vague definition of shaping and the natural blur that occurs with Service training. In addition, funding of these activities and the units provided to perform them are primarily controlled by the

Services, yet CINCs are accountable for successfully executing the shape element of the strategy. Resolution of all resourcing issues normally begins with clearly establishing and documenting requirements. Usually vague requirements are the result of poor or incomplete definitions. Therefore, the first task is for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Joint Staff and the regional theater CINCs, is to better define shape activities, clearly distinguishing them from respond or training activities. There will always be activities that contribute to more than one element of the strategy, or activities labeled the same but serving different purposes, as becomes evident when looking at the combined exercise programs conducted by European Command and Southern Command—their primary purpose serves distinctly different pillars of the strategy. A relatively fledgling effort, the Chairman's direction to develop TEPs, currently being performed by CINC staffs, will greatly help in identifying shaping activities and the resources needed to support them.

The TEP should serve as the primary tool to help distinguish between shape and respond activities. The TEP contains the CINC's plan to achieve engagement objectives, detailing the type and scope of engagement activities that support the CINC's theater strategy. Thus, the TEP links the strategic objectives to engagement activities which are designated by the CINCs, which include but are not limited to activities such as combined training, combined education, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, and humanitarian assistance. The TEPs are forwarded to the Chairman for review where they are integrated into a "global family of engagement plans."¹ When first conceived, the TEP cycle did not align with the PPBS cycle. In other words, all the good planning details coming from CINC and CINC component command staffs to support engagement activities were not making the annual programming window (two years prior to execution). The Joint Staff J-5 and J-8 recently corrected this misalignment, creating the

opportunity for the details found in the TEP to make their way into the first programming document of the PPBS, the CINC's IPL. The key—the TEP, an existing planning tool going through a maturing process, is the perfect instrument for each of the CINCs to use to define what shaping is in his theater and specifically what resources are required to successfully accomplish these activities. Given this is a loosely unconstrained list (which it presently isn't) it would form the baseline for the shaping requirements for each theater.

Determine the Current Relative Level of Shape Resourcing

In order to understand its investment in shape activities and to establish appropriate accountability, as well as maintain balance in the future, DoD must determine how much it currently expends on shape plus its validated unfunded activities—in other words, its true requirement. DoD currently does not know the relative level of shaping, it does not have a good estimate of the total shape requirement, nor the visibility to know how well the present shaping activities are resourced. This problem is understandable when one examines and better understands the origins and purpose of TEPs. At its inception, TEPs were designed primarily as an assessment or reporting tool, not a resourcing tool; evidenced by the complete disconnect between the TEP and PPBS cycles when TEPs were distributed to the CINCs for review. The CINC staffs, cueing on the fact they were developing a plan, automatically looked for the path to resourcing, which did not exist. Not only did the disconnect to the programming cycle exist, CINC staffs were told to build their resource estimates based on and within historical resource levels—in other words—don't grow shape requirements. This was extremely difficult, if not impossible, because there was no consolidated, previous planning estimate for engagement activities. With few exceptions, activities that were ongoing were buried as small parts of existing Service programatics supporting readiness, not visible to CINC staffs. The plain and

simple truth was—a bottom up review of shape requirements did not originally occur with TEP, it was more of an effort to document and report known ongoing efforts. Nonetheless, TEP holds promise to help better define shape, distinguishing its activities from respond, and to establish the unconstrained shape requirement.

This requirement is first stated in the broadest terms by the CINCs in their IPL, a key document Services reference in building their Service POMs. The IPL, the CINC's annual message to the Secretary of Defense stating his priorities in terms of broad capabilities, has been another source of the problem of defining requirements. Historically, there have been as many formats to an IPL as there are CINCs. The primary reason for this is that the CINC staffs have all interpreted different ways to best answer the inevitable and nearly always "near-term" question coming from the Services or Joint Staff, "Is it [the resource the CINC is asking for] in your IPL?", with a resounding "yes." In the past some CINC staffs have simply rank ordered any and every program/platform that could conceivably be called upon for use in the theater. Others have formed broad categories of capabilities required, careful to select a group of categories so broad as to capture any unforeseen need. Still others have submitted a combination of both. All of these approaches watered-down the IPL's effectiveness.

However, the IPL has great potential utility to help the CINCs' components, the Services who will ultimately decide the initial commitment to resource those components' requirements, and the Joint Staff, all understand the relative priority of the capabilities each CINC needs. Also, CINC staffs can easily show how these capabilities support the broad categories of shape and respond and the overall CINC strategy for the region. The real problem in IPL utility and interpretation originated from attempts to use a strategic long-term document to help solve tactical near-term resourcing disconnects. It has been established that we can use the TEP to

document tactical shape requirements, let's not fall back into the trap of documenting them again in the IPL. Correctly focusing the formatting of the IPL to the strategic level, the Joint Staff and OSD could use the document to obtain an integrated, albeit subjective assessment of the balance between shaping and responding as seen from the each of the CINCs.

CINC staffs have in the past also documented critical resource shortfalls by submitting "IPL Issue Sheets," which generally have identified disconnects between their own (some CINCs have a portion of their resourcing under their control and documented in their own POM submission to their Service executive agent) or their component's requirements and the level of resourcing found in the Service's POM. Remembering that the IPL serves as the "last planning document" and the "first programming document" in the PPBS process, the IPL issue sheets generally highlight the areas where CINC desired activities have been neglected by the Services in their programming process. Generally, a copy of the issue sheet, which can originate at the CINC staff or Service Component staff serving the CINC, is submitted to the Service for consideration in the upcoming POM build.

A frustration to both the Services and the Joint Staff, there are currently efforts ongoing to standardize the IPL format which will contribute to elevating the document to its intended strategic stature. In the fall of 1999, the Joint Staff asked the CINCs to follow a two-part format. Section one contained the CINC's Vision and Key Capabilities necessary to carry out his assigned mission. While no specific level of fidelity was dictated for presenting the capabilities, some of the CINCs chose the categories on the same level that the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process uses. The Joint Staff asked that no priorities be discussed in section one. Section two contained only those critical resourcing shortfalls the CINCs were experiencing that either prohibited or impeded the attainment of the capabilities identified in the

first section. This format is a step in the right direction and seems to elevate the document to the strategic level, depending on the level of the CINCs' articulated capabilities. Certainly the JWCA Ribbon level is appropriate and will help those CINCs who use the JWCA process to influence Service resourcing decisions. Most of these resourcing decisions likely would support the CINCs' strategic objectives, given they were made in the right venues, which is the focus of the next recommendation.

Create Resourcing Venues for Shaping to Fairly Compete

After clearly defining shaping activities and the appropriate resourcing level to carry them out, the next step is to ensure that these shaping activities only compete with other shaping activities as they make their way through the PPBS, thus removing the potential to compete against readiness at the individual requirement level. Improving the CINCs' visibility into Service POMs is the key to determining the status of resourcing shaping activities as they make their way through the Service funding venues. In this way, CINC staffs will know when and why support is provided or withheld by the Services.

The first step in achieving the first of these two measures is to establish resource evaluation groups within the Services in the Pentagon to deal with only shaping activities. Requirements originating and flowing from the theater CINC TEPs must make their way into Service Component POM submissions, as a part of a program that may only compete within these resource evaluation groups. This may require the Service to create a separate program. For example, the Army's resource evaluation groups are called Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs). Presently, most shaping activities are buried within readiness programs that usually compete within the Army's Training PEG. There are some programs, such as the CINC's Traditional CINC Activities (TCA) program which are totally shaping activities and have a program of their

own, but also compete within the Army's Training PEG against readiness programs. Whatever the case, a trail for each of the requirements originating in the TEP must be cleared so that as the requirement moves through the PPBS process, there is visibility to the Service component level responsible to the CINC. This will require the Services to treat shaping activities separately and with greater fidelity within their POMs. The emergence of the TEP and the TEP activities annexes easily provide the details normally needed to feed the component's engagement activities submission to the Services for resourcing in their POM build. This fidelity must provide Service components with the visibility required to report their support to the CINCs' engagement plans, keeping in mind that some Service components serve more than one CINC. Over time and depending on the Services' level of commitment to this first step, this process may need to evolve into a more centralized process controlled and overseen by OSD, through a central transfer account, but still executed primarily through the Services.

Given that the first step is accomplished, the second step is to ensure visibility to the CINCs and their staffs. This can occur by fine-tuning the focus and the use of existing processes and forums. Greater fidelity in Service POMs and a dedicated forum and review of only shaping activities would enable the Services to convey to the CINCs in their POM Tab I the specific level of resourcing afforded to each CINC's shaping activities. No longer would CINC staffs be second-guessing what or the level of support they received from the Service when a POM is released—it would be in black and white. CINC staffs would then be able to engage any disconnects to influence subsequent POM releases. In the event critical disconnects remained, CINCs would report these during the summer JWCA visit, specifically to the Regional Presence and Engagement Ribbon, who would determine whether the item warranted language in the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). The CPA is the Chairman's assessment of how well

the Service POMs support the Defense Planning Guidance and the CINCs' IPLs. If resourcing still was insufficient in a CINC's view, he could continue to pursue resourcing through the summer program review and ultimately the fall budget review, culminating in a Major Budget Issue (MBI).

Of course the process for the next Fiscal Year Development Program (FYDP) also begins in the fall, so critical shaping resource disconnects would make their way into section two of the CINC's IPL, which as described earlier highlights critical resource shortfalls for the Services to address in the subsequent POM build. In this way the CINC staffs could brief the items identified in section two of the IPL to the JWCA teams during their winter visit, only this time for consideration to include in the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) language, which highlights the Chairman's recommendations to the Services for their upcoming POM build. Thus, with minor adjustments to existing PPBS venues and processes the DoD can improve the visibility and accountability of resourcing the shape element of the NMS.

Notes

¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, "Theater Engagement Planning", Draft Revision CJCSM 3113.01, February 1999, A-2.

Chapter 5

Conclusion—Shaping Should Stand On Its Own

...To protect American security, we must stay ahead of change—indeed we must shape and direct that change. If we are to shape the future, we have to resist the natural impulse to be near-sighted—to focus our defense strategies, resources and choices mainly on the world as we know it. During the Cold War, when the threat forecast was relatively constant and the adversaries were well identified, our principal security challenges were clear. But in today's world, when the threat forecast is more blurry and changeable, we must focus a greater share of our attention on the strategy and requirements for meeting the unknown challenges of the long-term.¹

--Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White

Note the Secretary White's emphasis on building a strategy that can balance the short and long-term security interests of the United States—a strategy that helps us focus a portion of our energies on shaping the world as we want it, not simply responding to the world as we know it. The NMS that emerged advocated “shape” along with “prepare now” to contribute to this long-term focus, while “respond” encompassed our immediate and short-term needs. Most agree that the surest and best way to resist a temptation is to remove the source of that temptation. This paper begs the answering of this question—why pass up the opportunity to determine and place the correct amount of emphasis on the “shape” element of our NMS, and remove the possibility of its resources becoming hostage to near-term unforeseen requirements, particularly when the purpose of the long-term element of the strategy is to help decrease the number and intensity of the events causing the unforeseen requirements?

Clearly, theater warfighting CINCs best understand and believe in the priority and the importance of shaping the international security environment because they've been given the mission and have experienced the results first hand. They, through their position and access at the senior level understand the benefits of face-to-face contact and how this greatly influences national security decision-making in their areas of responsibility. Even more, they realize the potential impact the armed forces of the United States can have in influencing the future leadership in these countries simply through demonstrating the proper role of a military within a democracy. This belief does not diminish their concern for readiness; in fact, the two are complementary.

Moreover, the good news is that properly resourcing the shape element of the NMS is not "expensive," especially when weighed in the long-term. However, improperly resourcing it often proves very costly. General Clark testified to Congress that combined funding for the Joint Contact Team Program, the State Partnership Program, the Marshall Center, and International Military Education and Training in his area was approximately 60 million dollars in 1998.² While not all of his shaping activities, it is clear that the magnitude of funding for shaping is an order of magnitude below that of responding and preparing. Even if the costs are in the hundreds of millions yearly, it's inexpensive compared to the billions that flow yearly while responding to crises. The potential benefits are immeasurable.

Achieving the proper resourcing of the shape pillar of the NMS by providing a dedicated programmatic will first let senior DoD leadership know how much they are investing in this element of the strategy, and after they've decided on the desired balance between the pillars, it will ensure this balance is maintained. Small adjustments within the PPBS, TEP and JWCA/JROC processes will provide the CINCs the needed visibility to ensure adequate

resourcing of all three pillars of the NMS. As one staff officer on a CINC staff, who's fighting the budget battles day-to-day commented, "we're being asked to fight on three fronts with only two lines of logistics." If opening an additional, dedicated line of logistics means our CINCs may more often be relegated to fighting the "best kind of war," then it will be well worth the "hard work and ingenuity" Secretary Perry astutely proclaimed it will require.

Notes

¹ John P. White, "National Defense Into the 21st Century: Defining the Issues", Remarks prepared for delivery by Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White to the Association of the United States Army, Washington D.C., 24 February 1997, np, on-line, Internet, 30 November 1999, available from <http://www.ausa.org/legislat/items/21cent.html>.

² Senate, *Prepared Testimony of General Wesley K. Clark, Commander in Chief, United States European Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 3 March 1998, np, on-line, Internet, 30 November 1999, available from CIS, Congressional Universe.

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